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Abstract
This paper describes a quiet but dramatic revolution in how science is to be understood that is now
going on. In this revolution, long-standing ideas of science and nature as completely ordered under
the rule of natural law are called into question by scientists, historians, philosophers and sociolo-
gists, each grappling with how science works in practice. As a result there has been a fundamental
reexamination of how natural order can and should be understood. These new perspectives on nature
have exciting, challenging implications for both science and theology,of which I hope to give a sense
here.
1. The quiet revolution
Since the Scientific Revolution, natural philosophy and Christian natural theology have united
to place man in a well-ordered universe, and with a powerful argument. Appearances notwith-
standing – so the argument goes – the empirical and conceptual successes of modern science
testify that we live in a world in which every natural event is the outcome of universal and
immutable natural law. This image even survived quantum indeterminacy and chaos: the
universe is still universally law-governed though some of its most basic laws are probabilistic
and many of its occurrences may be virtually impossible to predict.
In the last decade this four-hundred-year-old image has been powerfully challenged, unsur-
prisingly perhaps in the social sciences, but importantly in biology and even in physics. The
challenge appears through an unheralded revolution in the philosophy and history of science
where increasingly the traditional view of an ordered science is put into question. This break-
down of order is not along any one fissure nor provoked by any one great discovery like the
quantum of action, nor does it emerge from just one science. Rather, it appears in many
distinct, highly detailed studies of scientific practice. Though generally unrelated to one
another, these diverse studies have in common a radical split from the standard view. They
propose alternatives to universal laws as the central explanatory and predictive mechanisms
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of nature. This questioning of the order of science has come from analyses of successful sci-
entific practice across the disciplines, from fundamental physics through biology to political
economy. In philosophy of science it is no longer assumed without question that the order
of nature is complete and that its laws are universal and exceptionless. What then does this
tell us about Gods plan for nature and his plans for us and indeed about God himself?
The tradition of Natural Religion, especially, looks to the world to teach us about the nature of
its Creator, and Natural Religion often has special appeal to scientists because of its emphasis
on the empirical basis for religious belief. The intimate connection supposed between Gods
nature and the nature of the world He created implies that this revolution in thought about
the order of nature may have profound theological implications. This paper aims in the first
place to provide a sense of these new images of nature and in the second to sketch out some
deep and very serious new questions they raise about Gods role in nature and the role He
assigns to mankind for the order that is to emerge in it.
A familiar issue related to my topic is emergentism. Though my concerns here dovetail with
this theme they are orthogonal to it. Emergentism has to do with the possible failure of
vertical reductionism: the idea that the more basic levels of reality do not determine or fix
what happens at higher levels; that new phenomena, new characteristics, even new laws of
nature emerge at larger dimensions, more mass, higher velocities or increased complexity.
Philosophical support for emergentism can be found in wide-ranging work in philosophy of
science, in theology and in philosophy of mind over the last thirty-five years. In this paper
I am concerned with what can be described as horizontal reductionism: the idea that the
cover of natural law, at any one level or crossing all levels, may not be complete; that order
may remain to be made in nature by us, not just discovered. The recent philosophical work
I draw on is less well understood and concomitantly less regimented than that on vertical
reductionism and emergence — open I feel for new perspectives and a new visioning of the
kind of order science reveals in nature. That said, one may describe the possibility of making
order where none is dictated as a kind of emergentism that is distinct from the conventional
one that downward reduction fails. It is one that rests in new considerations about failure of
the universal cover of law.
2. The cadres
The reaction against the received view of scientific laws as universal and exceptionless has
been as diverse and widespread as the scientific disciplines from which criticisms have been
developed. No one view is the same as any other. But they have in common a picture in
which laws are not the immutable and exceptionless governors of a nature completely ordered
under them. To give just a brief and incomplete overview there are accounts that argue that:
• laws are ineliminably ceteris paribus [1, 2, 3];
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• many basic laws are causal principles that do not describe exceptionlessly regular (i.e.
totally ordered) behavior [4];
• laws emerge historically so are not temporarily universal [5, 6, 7];
• the sources of these historically emergent laws are contingent; so the laws too are
contingent [5];
• laws hold only relative to models [8, 9, 10];
• laws emerge only in structured environments [11, 12, 13, 14, 15];
• nature is governed not by laws but by powers, capacities and tendencies [16, 17, 18, 19];
• nature is governed merely by local necessities [20, 21, 22];
• laws hold with varying degrees and kinds of invariance [23];
• laws serve primarily as tools or guides to practice [24, 25];
• laws of science arise as negotiated principles [26, 27];
• laws of science look univocal and universal but have di↵erent meanings for di↵erent
practitioners or in di↵erent circumstances [26];
• the amount of information contained in the history of the universe is not su cient to
compute/produce precise laws.
To illustrate these kinds of claims I shall here look briefly into studies in two disciplines in
the natural sciences: biology and physics.
2.1 Biology
Biology has long been criticized: it is not a proper science because it does not have proper
laws. Now those who study its various practices and the many impressive successes they
produce are fighting back. Perhaps the traditional view of what counts as proper science
with proper laws has been mistaken all along. Contemporary biology seems to have just
what it takes to describe nature successfully and to put its knowledge to use.
Probably two researchers who are most vocal in arguing that this is in general true across
biology and even far more widely are John Dupr, head of Egenis, Exeter University’s Centre
for the Study of Life Sciences, y, and University of Pittsburgh philosopher of biology, Sandra
Mitchell [28]. Consider Mitchell:
Take [...] Mendels law of segregation. That law says that in all sexually reproducing
organisms, during gamete formation, each member of an allelic pair separates from the
other member to form the genetic constitution of an individual gamete. So, there is a
50:50 ratio of alleles in the mass of the gametes. In fact, Mendels law does not hold
universally. We know two unruly facts about this causal structure. First, this rule applies
only after the evolution of sexually reproducing organisms, an evolutionary event that, in
some sense, need not have occurred. Second, some sexually reproducing organisms dont
follow the rule because they experience meiotic drive [...] Does this mean that Mendels
law of segregation is not a law?
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From hosts of cases in biology like this various authors conclude that rather than good old-
fashioned proper laws biology o↵ers instead:
• laws that emerge historically;
• laws that are contingent.
These two come naturally from Mitchells first two sources of unruliness. They also conclude
that biology o↵ers only
• laws that are not exceptionless.
This is a natural account given Mitchells second source of unruliness. Di↵erent kinds of
cases far from evolutionary biology, in molecular or neurobiology for instance, lead others to
propose that biology studies not laws that describe regular behavior that must occur, but
rather:
• mechanisms that, functioning properly and in the right places, can generate regular
behavior, for instance the interactions of the structures of non-RNA strands with tRNA
molecules and ribosomes to underwrite protein synthesis.
Mitchell also points to authors who claim that biology studies:
• ceteris paribus laws, laws that hold only in special circumstances.
She herself advocates something more practical and this is a piece of advice that she proposes
to carry outside of biology across the disciplines, from economics to physics: “We need to
rethink the idea of a scientific law pragmatically or functionally, that is, in terms of what
scientific laws let us do rather than in terms of some ideal of a law by which to judge the
inadequacies of the more common (and very useful) truths [of the kind biology teaches]” [28].
Mitchell argues that we should do away with the old dichotomy, law vs. non-law, or what is
universal, exceptionless, immutable versus all the rest, to be replaced by a sliding scale, and
along a variety of di↵erent dimensions:
[All] general truths we discover about the world vary with respect to their degree of con-
tingency on the conditions upon which the relationships described depend. Indeed, it is
true that most of the fundamental laws of physics are more generally applicable, i.e. are
more stable over changes in context, in space and time, than are the causal relations we
discover to hold in the biological world. They are closer to the ideal causal connections
that we choose to call laws. Yet, few of even these can escape the need for the ceteris
paribus clause to render them logically true.
Looking at how the successes of science are produced across the disciplines, it is truths of
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varying forms with varying degrees of universality and exceptionalnesses, describing various
degrees and kinds of order, that let us do what we need to do to produce those successes.
2.2 Physics
Mitchells final remarks bring us to physics, which is eventually where the conversation goes
when order is challenged: “Surely the world of physics is totally ordered and if physics is
ordered, so is all the rest.” I should begin by emphasizing that the second half of this claim
is clearly a mistake. The past thirty-five years of research I referred to in philosophy and
elsewhere on what I called downwards reduction and emergentism shows that we do not have
anything like su cient grounds to assume that physics dictates all the way up. But our topic
here is horizontal reductionism: does physics o↵er laws that dictate a complete order among
the very kinds of events that physics studies? A number of very di↵erent kinds of studies
suggest that this is not so.
The first suggest that the laws of physics, in common with all the other laws of science,
are ceteris paribus laws. Consider philosopher of physics Marc Lange: “To state the law
of thermal expansion [which states that the change in length of an expanding metal bar is
directly proportional to the change in temperature] [...] one would need to specify not only
that no-one is hammering the bar on one end, but also that the bar is not encased on four
of its six sides in a rigid material that will not yield as the bar is heated, and so on” [29].
There is naturally a canonical reply by defenders of the universal rule of physics. The list
indicated by “and so on” is indefinite only if expressed in a language that purportedly avoids
terminology from physics, the condition is easily stated: The law of thermal expansion is
rigorously true if there are no external boundary stresses on the bar throughout the pro-
cess” [29].
This brings into focus the technical terms of physics, like stress. How far do these stretch?
Here the very virtues of physics get it into trouble. The terminology of physics is tightly con-
trolled. This is what distinguishes it from disciplines that hardly count as science at all, that
use terminology like globalization or unconscious desire, terms that have no such rigid criteria
for their application. There are rules in physics for how to use language, how, for instance,
to ascribe a quantum field or a classical force. Rules like F = GMm/r2 when two masses a
distance r apart interact. And in most situations there are a number of factors a↵ecting the
outcome that we do not know how to describe using these regimented descriptions.
In physics there is no rule that takes you from the bar is being hammered to the bar is
subject to certain stresses. The rules for assigning terms like stress require not loose terms of
everyday use to apply but a far more technical, regimented vocabulary. Stresses and strains
are characterized as forces and force functions have strict rules for application, rules like
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F = GMm/r2 when two masses r apart interact, F = ✏0q1q2/r2 when two charges interact,
and so forth. And it is not clear that every time a bar is hammered one of these more
technical descriptions obtain.
We can say that the bar must be under stress because of the way its behavior is a↵ected.
But that reduces physics to the status of psychoanalysis. We can say that I have certain
unconscious desires because of the odd way my behavior is a↵ected. A physics that allows us
to say things on that kind of basis is not the physics that yields the precise predictions and
exact control of nature that gives us reason to think its laws are true. Better to suppose the
laws are ceteris paribus than to deprive them of their power to predict precisely and of the
huge empirical support this power provides.
A second kind of study looks at the interactions among di↵erent kinds of physicists, for
example instrument physicists, experimentalists, and theorists. Much of this work comes
from the brilliant Harvard historian of physics, Peter Galison, beginning with his studies of
neutral currents of the hunt for the Higgs particle, in which he pointed out that experimen-
talists and theoreticians use many of the same words but they often mean something very
di↵erent by them. That is because the meaning of the technical terms in physics is given
not by single definitions in language antecedently understood but rather by the whole net-
work of assumptions and inferences with other technical terms that can be made using them.
Experimentalists and theoreticians make very di↵erent assumptions and inferences, caring
little about the bulk of what the other says about neutral currents or the Higgs particle and
often not understanding it. This is like the well known incommensurability thesis of Thomas
Kuhn, with Galisons thick descriptions of the kinds of di↵erent assumptions that the exper-
imentalists and theoreticians make about neutral currents or the Higgs particle added on to
flesh it out.
What Galison contributes that is really new is his account of how the two groups do com-
municate, as they do when theoretical claims are tested. The two groups meet in what is
analogous to a trading zone, where neithers home language is understood by the other. They
use between them a trading language, a highly specific linguistic structure “that fits between
the two”. Really a pidgin or perhaps even a Creole. Galison stresses that he intends “the
pidginization and Creolization of scientific language to be treated seriously just the way one
would address such issues for language more generally” [30], not as a loose metaphor.
This is a nice solution to the incommensurability problem that rings true to the historical
descriptions Galison provides. But pidginization raises real problems for the traditional ac-
count of laws. The laws of physics are supposed to be universal and comprehensive, but they
are also supposed to be well tested. So which laws are these? It is the theoreticians laws,
fitting together into an integrated theoretical package, that have a claim to be comprehen-
sive; it is the experimental laws with their connections to all the requisite experimentalist
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assumptions that are tested. And the pidgin laws will generally not have enough back up
from the home languages to do either. There is a plurality of laws here and together they
serve our pragmatic needs, as Sandra Mitchell urges. Picking, choosing, and combining, we
can do what we need to do. But there is no set of well-tested laws that looks comprehensive
enough to support total order in the domain of physics.
My own work on testing, evidence, and induction in physics fits well with the Galison story.
The dramatic empirical successes of modern physics, both its precise experimental predictions
and its fantastic technological applications, undoubtedly provide evidence for very concrete
detailed kinds of physics claims, claims that are much like blue prints for how the apparatus
operates. These claims are not a-theoretical in any way – the laser pumps a population
of atoms into an inverted quantum state, but they are very detailed – thats how we get
the operation of the device just right – and in mixed vocabulary, from di↵erent branches of
physics and from pure and applied engineering at all di↵erent levels. The problem is that
these detailed claims do not relate in the right way for inductive support to flow upwards
to the most fundamental laws of physics, at least if the fundamental laws are taken in the
traditional way as claims of universal scope. The picture I am left with is a world of physics
that is ordered very precisely and very tightly, but in patches, and with gauzy edges. That is
what I describe in my book “The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science” [12].
The title is taken from the Gerard Manley Hopkins poem, Pied Beauty:
Glory be to God for dappled things
For skies of couple
colour as a brindled cow...
Were my book alone, I would still immodestly be urging that the breakdown of the tradi-
tional image of the completely ordered universe projected from science should be taken very
seriously. But my work is not at all alone. My approach is just one among what is now a
large and diverse body of work that sees science operating across the board very di↵erently
from the traditional image of universal laws and complete order.
I would not want to claim that all of this work is uncontroversial. Nor do many of the authors
draw the kinds of general conclusions I do here. Most restrict their conclusions to the specific
practices they study in the specific disciplines they know intimately. What is impressive is
how many such studies there are and how many di↵erent disciplines they span. It is as if,
once the idea has broken down that the successes of modern science speak for the universal
rule of law and the complete order of nature the flaws in the usual account can be seen here,
there, and everywhere. The point is that these studies are widespread, detailed, and diverse,
by serious scholars seriously trying to account for how the sciences work. Though perhaps
controversial, they should not be ignored, neither in our attempts to understand the world
nor in our attempts to understand God and His intentions about our responsibility for the
order of nature.
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Others too have noted the implications of the new pictures of nature, the nature of God
and Gods relation to man. In a recent book [31] Owen Gingerich argues that these new
groundbreaking views of nature as not universally law-governed fit particularly well with his
claim that God judiciously intervenes in nature at key points to direct its ends. This adds
support to his impassioned argument that science and theism be viewed as compatible and
complementary.
3. What follows?
I close with a very brief sketch of the kinds of theological problems I think we must now face
up to. Since at least the Scientific Revolution three theses have marched hand in hand:
– God has created a perfect world fine-tuned to his ends.
The perfection of Gods plan has been taken to be reflected in the fact that:
– there is a universal and complete order in nature.
Because of its complete and perfect order,
– what happens in nature can be described in universal and exceptionless laws.
Generally these complete and exceptionless laws have been taken to be mathematical, though
there have been notable exceptions such as the romantic movement that extolled the variety
and complexity of nature and A. N. Whitehead and his fellow thinkers at the turn of the last
century who took the biological as the basic order.
There have been over two centuries of questioning whether nature needs God as its source.
But little doubt that if God is the source of nature, it is a perfect nature whose perfection is
revealed in its complete and universal order, an order that can be described in exceptionless
laws. So the second and third theses have remained intact until very recently. But as we
have seen, in the last decade and a half the quiet revolution about the character of the laws
of nature and the order they describe casts serious doubts on whether the sciences do indeed
describe a uniformly law-governed world.
But if the canonical assumptions of the second and third theses are to be called into question,
then it is natural to inquire into the implications this new picture has for understanding the
nature of Gods perfection and Gods role versus the responsibility God assigns to us in the
unfolding and fine-tuning of nature. The revolution in contemporary history and philosophy
of science introduces the possibility that it was a mistake to assert the link between Gods
perfection and His omnipotence on the one hand and the complete and uniform order in
nature on the other. Once we, like Gerard Manley Hopkins, are freed from the assumption
that perfection must come in the form of exceptionless regularity, we can consider alternative
senses in which the world could be ordered. We can also ask how such alternative kinds of
order are consistent with the idea that God fine-tunes nature to direct what emerges, as well
as what lessons follow about His intentions for mans role in nature. If God made a universe
in which much of the creation of order is left to man, what conclusions should we draw about
106
The Order of Nature Volume 5
Summer 2013
the nature of God and his perfections, of Gods relation to man and the universe, and of mans
responsibilities in the universe?
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